Drawing on the analogy between thing-perceptions and value-perceptions (Part 3), I show, first, that ‘cold’ valueceptions are to be identified with empty apprehensions ( Auffassungen) of value, in which an emotion is not actually experienced but is anticipated in such-and-such kinaesthetic circumstances (Part 4) second, that the realization of this anticipation amounts to the fulfillment of the valueception (Part 5).

The core of the paper is then devoted to a systematic reconstruction of Husserl’s solution to this controversy. I start by pointing out that, contrary to what most scholars have assumed so far, Husserl’s theory of valueception is not tantamount to Meinong’s, as it is very sensitive to ‘Hildebrandian’ arguments (Part 2). The aim of the paper is to argue that the Husserlian phenomenology of affectivity, especially as it is developed during his Göttingen period, can help to overcome these two accounts. On the other hand, the ‘Hildebrandian’ side contends that since valueceptions can be ‘cold’, they are not accomplished in emotions but rather reside in ‘value-feelings’ – emotions, in this framework, being conceived of as reactions to the values thus revealed. On the one hand, the ‘Meinongian’ side claims that axiological properties are experienced exclusively in emotions.

In the recent literature, two main standpoints have emerged.

This paper explores the nature of our experiences of values – our valueceptions.

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